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There has been a lot of  ambiguity concerning Russia’s recent policy in the Middle East, especially about its causes, scope and consequences. While some say that Moscow 
“does not have a Grand Strategy for the Middle East it has a clear view of  its interests in 
specific	situations	within	the	region”1 that serves the Kremlin’s higher and broader goals 
of  reestablishing Russia as one of  the key actors in international affairs. This article argues 
that Moscow’s diplomatic, military and economic actions in the Middle East, represent an 
example	of 	a	type	of 	grand	strategic	behaviour	embodied	in	a	flexible	and	pragmatic	policy	
that goes far beyond ad hoc tactical gains. 
Making sense of Russia’s strategic behaviour
Since	2015,	there	has	been	a	significant	increase	in	Russia’s	military	and	diplomatic	presence	
in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA). The most notable was the country’s 
intervention in Syria (launched in September 2015) that helped the regime of  President 
Bashar al-Assad to remain in power. With the relative success of  Moscow’s actions in 
Syria, Russia reasserted itself  in the MENA region as a major actor and serious weapons 
supplier. In terms of  diplomatic gains, the Kremlin has become an important player in 
mediating	conflicts	from	Libya	to	Yemen	and	an	aspiring	power	broker	in	Syria.	Moreover,	
Russia’s economic and energy activities in the region have also been on the rise: state-
owned companies (Rosneft, Lukoil) have oil and gas projects in Algeria, and Libya while 
in Egypt, Russian nuclear energy giant Rosatom is set to build and operate a 4,800 MW 
nuclear plant.2 
Russia’s presence in the region has stirred many debates on Russian foreign policy and 
the degree to which it constitutes a strategic design or rather something more opportunistic. 
1  D. Trenin, What is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Cambridge, Polity, 2018, p.86.
2  M. Russell, E. Pichon, “Russia in Africa”, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2019.
* This paper is the result of  a research conducted by the author while being an Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense 
College between September and November 2019.
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While most experts acknowledge the return of  Russia to the Middle East, there is no 
consensus about the scope and policy goals.3 As a 2017 RAND report stated, Russia’s 
actions suggest that it is “applying a generalized, functional strategy. It constantly seeks 
to improve its short-term economic, military, and political advantages while reducing the 
short-term advantages of  prospective adversaries”.4 
However, in an attempt to understand Russia’s actions in the Middle East and beyond, it 
is helpful to apply a slightly different framework that offers a more substantive explanation 
for the character and nature of  the Kremlin’s policies. According to such a framework, 
three different meanings of  Grand Strategy should be differentiated: grand plans; grand 
principles and grand behaviour.5 
Grand Strategy is a multifaceted and thoroughly debated concept. For the purpose of  
this analysis, grand strategy is understood to be, in the words of  Barry Posen, “a nation-
state’s theory about how to produce security for itself ” and is mainly used here as a 
“conceptual framework that helps nations determine where they want to go and how they 
ought to get there”.6 This article does not refer to its more restricted meaning of  “a plan for 
using military means to achieve political ends”, but rather to a broader overarching scheme 
of  ideas, plans and behavior that explains state’s vital strategic policies in international 
affairs.7 This provides a more practical and up to date approach of  analysis for Russia’s 
circumstances in the region.
The argument here underscores the idea that Russia has a type of  grand (strategic) 
behaviour in world affairs, in which behaviour in the Middle East region is only one – not 
necessarily the most important – element. As the political nature of  the Russian Federation’s 
regime	makes	it	difficult	to	monitor	Moscow’s	grand plans; and as interests rather than grand 
principles traditionally drive Russia’s foreign policy, grand strategic behaviour appears to be 
the most tangible (and visible) element of  Russian statecraft. In other words, since the 
longstanding	autocratic	political	system	prevents	transparent	access	to	studying	both	official	
strategic objectives (grand plans) and the policy-making process, it is through examining the 
long-term pattern in Russia’s allocation of  military, diplomatic and economic resources 
(grand behaviour), that one is able to make sense of  the Kremlin’s increased activity in the 
3  A. Shumilin, I. Shumilina, “Russia as a gravity pole of  the GCC’s new foreign policy pragmatism”, The International Spec-
tator, 2017; M. Kofman and M. Rojansky, “What kind of  victory for Russia in Syria?”, Military Review, 2018.
4  J. Sladden, B. Wasser, B. Connable, S. Grand-Clement, “Russian strategy in the Middle East”, Perspective Paper, RAND 
Corporation, Washington, DC, 2017.
5  N. Silove, “Beyond the buzzword: the three meanings of  ‘Grand Strategy’”, Security Studies, Vol.27, No.1, 2017, pp.27-57.
6  H. Brands, What good is Grand Strategy? Power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 2014, p.3; B. R. Posen, Restraint: a new foundation for US Grand Strategy, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2014, p.1.
7  R. K. Betts, “Is strategy an illusion?”, International Security, Vol.25. No.2, Fall 2000, p.6.
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Middle East.
Even though Russia does not have a conventionally understood Grand Strategy, neither 
at the regional nor global level, its policy in the Middle East could be viewed functionally 
as a type of  grand behaviour	–	defined	as	“the	long-term	pattern	in	[a]	state’s	distribution	and	
employment of  military, diplomatic, and economic resources towards ends”8 – typical of  
great powers. Thus, Russia’s Middle East policy is a sort of  indirect strategy with limited 
objectives and relatively modest resources. The Kremlin seems to view its regional behaviour 
as a chance to build up international prestige on the cheap (military engagement in Syria; 
paramilitaries present in both Syria and Libya; tightening the economic ties with Egypt 
and Algeria; increasing arms sales to regional powers). Additionally, Moscow’s diplomatic, 
economic and military presence in the region should be understood not only in terms of  
a response to power vacuums and the weakness of  external actors in the Middle East, but 
also in the context of  a more proactive domestically-driven Kremlin approach towards 
international affairs in its attempts to remake the international order.
Old game made new?
The roots of  contemporary Russian foreign policy behaviour can be traced to the 1990s, 
to the so-called Primakov Doctrine. As it was named after former Foreign Minister (1996-
98) and Prime Minister (1998-99) Yevgeny Primakov, the doctrine stated that a unipolar 
world dominated by the United States would be unacceptable to Russia. And therefore it 
offered countermeasures or guidelines for Russian foreign policy: “Russia should strive 
toward a multipolar world managed by a concert of  major powers that can counterbalance 
US unilateral power. Russia should insist on its primacy in the post-Soviet space and lead 
integration in that region. Russia should oppose NATO expansion”.9 All of  these elements 
remain	at	the	core	of 	Russia’s	foreign	policy	with	the	first	point	directly	related	to	Russian	
engagement in the Middle East. Thus, Russia’s actions today signal a return to policies 
resembling those of  Primakov in a new context.
One of  the predominant narratives about Moscow’s return to the Middle East frames 
Russian	 intervention	 in	 Syria	 as	 a	first	 and	 initial	 step	on	 the	way	 to	Russian	 increased	
diplomatic, economic and military presence in the region. Experts seem to agree on the 
scope of  the Kremlin’s policy in the Middle East, stressing that military intervention in Syria 
plays an important role in Russia’s greater plan or even “broader strategy”.10 According to 
8  Ibid., p.49.
9  E. Rumer, The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in action, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 June, 2019.
10  See F. C. Hof, V. Inozemtsev et al., “The Kremlin’s actions in Syria: origins, timing, and prospects”, Atlantic Council, 
2016; N. Popescu, S. Secrieru (eds.), “Russia’s return to the Middle East. Building sandcastles?”, Chaillot Papers 146, Paris, 
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some, there are elements of  strategic thinking in Moscow’s behaviour that go not only 
beyond Syria but beyond the Middle Eastern context. They include domestic concerns 
about potential terrorist connections (Moscow’s fears of  radical jihadi movements in the 
Caucasus); bringing Russia back to the main stage of  world affairs; and forcing NATO 
and the West (mainly the United States) to talk to Russia “as an equal”, thereby making the 
issue of  Ukraine and Crimea less relevant.11 Indeed, Russia’s relative success in Syria created 
the	foundation	for	its	comeback	as	a	significant	regional	player	equipped	with	substantial	
negotiating power to shape the future of  Syria and the broader region itself.12 In this way 
Syria has been a testing ground for Russia’s reformed military, showcasing new weapons for 
arms exports in the region and beyond. 
From revisionist to status quo power
Yet Moscow’s growing interest in the region predates its military intervention in Syria 
and can be traced back to the year 2011 and the aftermath of  Arab Uprisings,13 including 
the war in Libya. In fact, NATO’s intervention in Libya – that (inadvertently) resulted 
in	the	toppling	of 	the	Gadhafi	regime	–	has	often	been	cited	by	Russian	officials	as	the	
trigger that hastened Russian diplomatic, economic and military engagement in the MENA 
region. In February 2012 Vladimir Putin stated that since basic “principles of  international 
law were eroded and degraded” directly affecting international security, “Russia cannot 
fall back on diplomatic and economic methods alone to settle contradiction and resolve 
conflict”.14 Therefore “it faces the task of  developing its military potential as part of  a 
deterrence strategy”.15 This view was reinforced by the Russian political elite’s fear of  
so-called “coloured revolutions” in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood, perceived by the 
Kremlin in terms of  a security threat. 
In the context of  the Arab uprisings, the Kremlin framed itself  as a status quo power 
(that resonated well with regional regimes concerned about losing their power grip in the 
aftermath of  the Arab uprisings), blaming the US and NATO for “meddling in the domestic 
affairs of  other states” and consequently for regime changes and chaos that ensued in the 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2018.
11  E. Stepanova, “Russia in the Middle East: back to a ‘Grand Strategy� – or enforcing multilateralism?”, Politique étrangère, 
No.2/2016, p.8.
12	 	For	more	on	the	drivers	behind	Russia’s	new	policy	in	the	Middle	East,	see	E.	Stepanova,	“Russia	and	conflicts	in	the	
Middle East: regionalisation and implications for the West”, The International Spectator, 2018.
13  N. Kozhanov, Russian policy across the Middle East: motivations and methods, Chatham House, London, 2018.
14  V. Putin, “Being strong: national security guarantees for Russia”, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 February 2012.
15  Ibid.
25Russia’s new stRategic calculus in the Middle east w. Michnik
region.16 
Nevertheless, Russia’s presence and actions in the region are not without limits. Moscow 
does not appear to have the intention or resources to “own” the Middle East; rather Russia’s 
“strategic game plan is to construct a ‘polycentric world order� where the US will not be 
a	hegemon	[and]	more	non-Western	states	have	a	role	to	play”.17 In other words, Russia’s 
grand behaviour in the Middle East constitutes a type of  modern version of  the Primakov 
Doctrine.18 
Projecting Instability? Implications for NATO’s Southern 
Flank
Russia’s renewed interests and behaviour may be analyzed in both a regional and global 
framework. From a regional perspective, the Kremlin’s engagement in the Middle East 
indicates a mutual understanding between Moscow and its partners, that the Russian 
diplomatic and economic (and to some extent military) presence represents a positive 
and stabilizing force in a region that for the last two decades has been struggling with 
foreign military interventions, civil wars and popular uprisings. Beyond the Middle East, 
Russia’s regional policy is interconnected with Moscow’s ambition to counter the West –
most notably the United States, which has been increasingly viewed as an adversary. In this 
regard, Russia’s role in the region can be viewed as a by-product of  confrontation with the 
West.19 If  one accepts the above statement, this raises the question of  the practical effects 
of  Russia’s new military (Syria, Libya) and diplomatic (i.e. Egypt, Iran, Turkey, the Gulf  
States) activities vis-a-vis NATO’s security on the Southern Flank. 
Considering NATO’s relations with regional partners (i.e. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 
and Mediterranean Dialogue) and its broader agenda of  Projecting Stability, the Alliance 
should be wary of  any emerging initiatives that could potentially undermine partnerships 
with MENA states. 
There is the obvious connection between Russia’s policy in MENA and NATO’s 
security on the Southern Flank. It stems from the fact that threats from North Africa 
and the Middle East – ungoverned spaces, weak states and transnational threats such 
as	terrorism,	drug	gangs,	human	traffickers	and	weapons	smugglers	–	are	of 	a	different	
security nature than those coming from the Eastern Flank. Wars in Syria and Libya have 
16  B. Renz, “Russian responses to the changing character of  war”, International Affairs, Vol.95, Iss.4, July 2019, p.829.
17  M. Suchkov quoted in T. O’Connor, “The new Middle East: US military, Russia’s diplomacy and China’s Money”, 
Newsweek, 22 October 2019.
18  E. Rumer, The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 June, 2019.
19  N. Kozhanov, Russian policy across the Middle East: motivations and methods, Chatham House, London, 2018. 
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caused the largest refugee crisis affecting the EU and NATO’s European member states 
since World War II. And even though NATO does not need to deter Russia in the south, 
this does not mean that the Kremlin cannot indirectly impact NATO’s security with its 
activities in the region. On the contrary, Russia’s restored presence in the Middle East – 
especially its military intervention in Syria – made Moscow a serious, if  not the main, player 
in the Syrian peace process. This includes any important negotiations concerning external 
powers	in	the	conflict	(Turkey	and	Iran).	Likewise,	Kremlin’s	support	of 	Khalifa	Haftar’s	
Libyan National Army has added to the already complicated civil war in Libya.
Considering the complex relations and interdependence of  most actors engaged in the 
Syrian and Libyan wars, a scenario in which Russia uses its deal-making power to affect 
one of  NATO’s southern member states or partners is not unlikely. And such a move 
would	constitute	a	textbook	justification	of 	Kremlin	policy	in	the	Middle	East,	one	aimed	
at regaining Moscow’s status as a major global and regional player. Secondly, Russia’s 
improved	relations	with	other	significant	powers	in	the	region	provide	opportunities	for	
the Kremlin to position itself  as the main outside power in the MENA Region. With closer 
economic ties to Algeria and Egypt (the energy project to build a nuclear power plant) 
and active “investments” and “weapon systems sales” diplomacy in the Gulf, Moscow is 
looking to cement its role in the region as a shareholder of  the overall security architecture.20 
Given the delicate balance of  power in the Gulf  Region between Iran and Arab monarchies 
and the military campaign in Syria, demand for Russian defence systems (mainly S-400s) 
among Gulf  States is high.21 
Notwithstanding the fact that certain local countries (i.e. Saudi Arabia; the United 
Arab Emirates; Jordan) rely on the security guarantees of  some member states (mainly 
the US, the UK and France), a possible change of  status quo could affect regional security 
unfavourably and undermine NATO’s Projecting Stability project. 
In short, on the Southern Flank there is a new (returning) power that has to be reckoned 
with. Whether in Syria, Libya, Egypt, or (to a lesser extent) the Gulf  States, Russia has 
established a foothold. For NATO’s European members, this means that there is another, 
potentially threatening factor to consider in the region.
Misperceptions on Russia’s “grand behaviour”?
Russia’s grand behaviour in the region could potentially create a challenge for NATO’s 
cohesion and unity. Considering how important the Southern Flank is for the Alliance and 
how complex threats emerging from the region are, allowing a major adversarial power 
20  L. Watanbe, “Russia’s Renaissance in the Arab World”, Strategic Trends 2019.
21  J. Raine, “Russia in the Middle East: hard power, hard fact”, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018.
27Russia’s new stRategic calculus in the Middle east w. Michnik
– and for the time being, Russia remains one22 – to become a key playmaker across the 
MENA region for years to come, is a costly mistake. The recent spat between some NATO 
member states over Turkey’s military intervention in Syria, coupled with a looming danger 
to stability from various violent non-state actors and state-sponsored militias, underscore 
the need for approaching disruption on the Southern Flank comprehensively.
A	 potential	 first	 step	 to	 counter	 Russia’s	 “grand	 behaviour”	 would	 be	 stronger	
engagement with partners (Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) 
and raising the situational awareness of  the Southern NATO members about the Kremlin’s 
ability to shape the situation in their immediate neighbourhood (i.e. Syria, Libya, potentially 
Egypt). What NATO can offer to its partners in MENA (that Russia cannot) is a long-
lasting cooperation scheme that goes beyond ad hoc interests and addresses common 
security challenges (securing trade sea-lanes; transnational crime and terrorist threats) that, 
due to geographic proximity, affect both NATO members in the Southern Flank and the 
Alliance’s partners.
22	 	NATO	Leaders’	Meeting	in	London	reaffirmed	that	“Russia’s	aggressive	actions	constitute	a	threat	to	Euro-Atlantic	
security”, “London Declaration”, North Atlantic Council, London, 3-4 December 2019.
